"Effective measures for nuclear disarmament'

During the current session of the NPTPrepCom much mention was made of various possible approaches and vehicles for implementing article VI of the NPT on nuclear disarmament.  These included building blocks, step by step, giving effect to the 2010 NPT action plan, devising frameworks, comprehensive approach, Model Convention, action plan with a clearly defined timeframe, comprehensive and legally binding framework, humanitarian approach, a ban on possession of nuclear weapons, and more. This mix of possible procedural, legal and organisational devices is confusing especially when some states offer few insights into what they mean by the particular approach they support, let alone how to take it forward. 

Some clarity, however, was provided, notably by papers that were the focus of a side event* on 2 May organised by the NGOs, Reaching Critical Will and Article 36.  The papers (see links below) helped draw attention to what article VI itself specifies – the need for “effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament”.  So does it really matter how a particular approach is characterised when the focus should be on the question of what will be effective? 

Obviously, that is not going to be the end of the matter because of the subjectivity involved.  And the drafting of article VI is somewhat convoluted. Nonetheless, legal advisers in nuclear weapon states are likely to tread cautiously in any debate over the meaning of “effective measures”.  Those words need to be interpreted in the spirit of the NPT as a whole including the goal of elimination mentioned in the preamble and the question of good faith required by article VI.  

Similarly under scrutiny will be obstacles placed in the way of pursuing effective measures towards nuclear disarmament, or seeming indifference to the need to resolve implementation blockages in a constructive, timely way. The development of some impetus for nuclear disarmament - injecting new life into the issue – has become inevitable. The hope inspired by President Obama’s Prague speech has not been reflected in the forums where this business would normally be transacted. Inertia in established multilateral processes and arenas has been a spur to challenging traditional approaches both in terms of substance and forum.  An example is the empty debate over what is the ripest issue for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the lack of any sustained moves to broker compromise there. 

The absence of consensus on any one of the four mandates embodied in the work programme of that Conference since 2000 means that nothing happens on any of them.  Nuclear disarmament, the oldest of the 4 core issues, has been an enduring casualty.  Indeed, the entire multilateral nuclear disarmament scene is the cause of widespread concern.  The CD’s integrity is at stake, CD issues such as fissile materials have temporarily moved to another forum, the NPT has experienced healthier days, the UN Disarmament Commission had an unproductive 2014 session. And the Open-ended Working Group on nuclear disarmament was shunned by the NPT nuclear weapon states. 

It is hardly surprising that new ways for dealing with nuclear disarmament have emerged. These changing dynamics during the current NPT review cycle have led to almost a dozen multilateral and legal initiatives since the 2010 Review Conference. Those initiatives have as their underlying message to the nuclear weapon states that concrete efforts are needed in terms of producing effective measures toward nuclear disarmament. Yet, one such initiative, the humanitarian approach, has been criticised by nuclear weapon states in particular as a challenge to the authority of the NPT. Unfortunately, the humanitarian approach has been misconstrued by the NPT nuclear weapon states, and invitations to attend the Oslo and Nayarit conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons were turned down by them. 

The criticism of the humanitarian approach as “parallel” to the NPT disregards the preamble of the NPT and the 2010 Action Plan. This is an echo of criticisms made by some non-nuclear weapon states about “parallel” measures for non-proliferation pursued by the nuclear weapon states a decade ago. In reality, it is hard to differentiate the pedigree of the humanitarian approach from that of the P5 process initiated five years ago by the NPT nuclear weapon states and which met last month in Beijing.  That is not to belittle the P5 process in any way – greater leadership by the nuclear weapon states towards the implementation of article VI would be welcome. 

The extent to which the nuclear weapon states are responsive to the frustrations of non-nuclear weapon states can be gauged by measuring signs of increased transparency of their nuclear weapon holdings and greater commitment to NSAs in the context of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones in Asia. Evidence of progress on these fronts can perhaps be attributed to the growing pressure stemming from the new initiatives on nuclear disarmament, although disappointment marks many responses to date. 

In any event, when the five-yearly NPT Review Conference meets in 2015 to take stock and consider the next steps for the full implementation of article VI, it will be difficult to overlook increasing efforts by frustrated non-nuclear weapon states to turn attention away from perceived military and security values of nuclear weapons to their actual humanitarian impacts. The meaning of the words “effective measures” in article VI will be more readily demonstrated when such measures are seen as reinforcing the reality that a nuclear war in humanitarian terms is unwinnable and that an accidental detonation is not a hypothetical eventuality. 

There are valuable tools at hand for developing effective measures through papers tabled in the NPT PrepCom by the New Agenda Coalition and one published by Article 36 and Reaching Critical Will. Those papers help reduce obfuscation and sharpen the focus on how to get multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament under way as required by article VI. The clearer and simpler the message the better chance there is of gaining traction. 

The ultimate effective measure is of course a legally binding, universally observed, fully verified “elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery” to quote the NPT. But given that this end is not yet in prospect, what are the most effective measures towards that objective? What comes immediately to mind is the need for the development of the notion of “timeliness”.  This is a concept that has been vigorously contested in the NPT for much of its long life without success. 

If the 13 steps agreed at the NPT Review Conference in 2000 represent the clearest direction to date on the route to elimination, they lacked a crucial indication of effectiveness.  Efforts to define a timeframe for their implementation, let alone the means of assessing progress on their fulfilment, were steps too far for the nuclear weapon states in 2000.  There were some vague expressions of time, and even a specific one in relation to the conclusion of a ban prohibiting the production of fissile material. But there was nothing that would facilitate real accountability - nothing that would enable effective monitoring of progress towards implementation. 

Continuous resistance to a results-based approach using milestones and timelines let alone deadlines raises serious questions in terms of article VI. Pursuing the recognition of timeliness as a principle of effectiveness among the pantheon of NPT principles, notably those agreed in 1995, may seem inconsequential, perhaps derisory, given how long the NPT has been in force. But it is surely a litmus test of intentions and even of interpretation of the Treaty. 

* "Effective measures for nuclear disarmament" was the title of an event hosted on Friday, 2 May at UNHQ, New York.  It was organized by Reaching Critical Will and Article 36 and took place in the margins of the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting. Michael Hurley of Ireland spoke to the New Agenda Coalition’s document on article VI of the NPT and Ray Acheson of RCW introduced the joint RCW/Article 36 publication exploring the development of a legal framework for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. This posting contains contextual remarks made at that event by Tim Caughley, a senior fellow at UNIDIR.

Disarmament and development in Commonwealth states

One publication that's recently come across our desks here at UNIDIR is Vidya Abhayagunawardena's new book Commonwealth States on Disarmament and Development: A Socioeconomic Analysis.

The nature of the multilateral disarmament context in New York and Geneva often results in practitioners like diplomats, civil society advocates and United Nations staff being accustomed to slice-and-dice categorisations of the international community in certain ways  such as Non-Aligned, Eastern Group, Western Group. These categorisations help to shape mindsets. This is also true in the sphere of development work, which has its own typical categorisations. It matters because what we name things, and how we sort them in our minds, has an influence on the way we subsequently think and act.

However, all politics has a cultural substrate. Whatever the political or economic differences between states in the Commonwealth after independence from British colonial rule in the 20th century (and there are many), it's also clear that there is a common bank of institutions, practices and cultural references that has kept the Commonwealth relevant as an idea and an institution. One only has to see the huge popularity of a sport like cricket - a pastime unfathomable to most non-Commonwealth outsiders - in post-colonial entities as diverse as New Zealand, South Africa, the West Indies and Abhayagunawardena's own country, Sri Lanka. Without overstating their decisiveness (after all, India and Pakistan have fought wars on several occasions, despite the popularity of cricket in both countries), such commonalities can, in principle, strengthen cultural, social and business links between nations, and in that way strengthen peace and the rule of law.

So it's refreshing to see an analytical frame like Abhayagunawardena's. His book explores Commonwealth member states' commitment toward and adherence to six international treaties related to disarmament and development: the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the newest one of them all - the Arms Trade Treaty.

Abhayagunawardena argues that adherence to these international legal instruments provides a pathway to peaceful societies and to their greater commitment to human security. Their disarmament treaty commitments are analysed alongside various socioeconomic indicators, including population, GDP per capita income, the Human Development Index, the Millennium Development Goals and so forth.

I'm not sure it's yet possible to declare a verdict on Abhayagunawardena's thesis, especially on the basis of only six legal instruments. It would be interesting to see rates of adherence to human rights treaties in a future edition, for instance, to provide greater context. (The Disabilities Convention is foremost a human rights instrument, although placed in a disarmament and development context here.) And, for all of the steps forward in greater international adherence to the treaties he analyses, there have also been some steps back. These can't really be blamed on economic indices but on political decision making and priorities in those countries. 

In this respect, Abhayagunawardena argues that within the Commonwealth, "Trade and aid should be increased in proportion to the extent developing member states support disarmament." And this is fine in principle, although the politics of military aid aside, it's increasingly difficult in a rules-based international trade system for states to create such preferential trade systems.

Moreover, the author notes that only four Commonwealth countries of the 26 he analyses - Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK - contribute much overseas development aid, and none of them have met the Commonwealth's modest target of 0.7 per cent of their respective GDPs recently. Affecting policy in huge countries such as India or Nigeria through such relatively modest amounts of aid would stretch credulity. And, in Australia and New Zealand's cases, much of the aid these countries give is concentrated on their local neighbourhood in the Pacific. Their difficulties in influencing Fiji's regime over the last two-and-a-half decades underline the limitations aid policies have, even in a region in which Australia and New Zealand are the big fish in economic and development investment.

This just underlines that Commonwealth States on Disarmament and Development raises many interesting questions - far more than any book of this type could reasonably answer. By bringing a wealth of information together in one volume, the author has created a valuable resource for anyone seeking to familiarise themselves with the most internationally significant Commonwealth countries' adherence to recent disarmament law. Abhayagunawardena's recommendation that the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings should begin to hold regular disarmament and development discussions (and maintain a disarmament 'index') is thus intriguing, and might usefully help to focus attention on the dissonance sometimes observed between member states' words and deeds.

John Borrie

Science, humanity and humanitarian action

This blog analyses what the word “humanity” means and proposes that a new definition and a modern way of speaking of humanity could improve “humanitarian dialogue” with respect to weapons, their use and public health. It suggests that those who use the term “humanity”, especially the International Red Cross Movement, should replace relatively vague references with a dialogue based on scientific insights and current knowledge of what this notion means.

“Humanity” is used in different ways. It can mean human beings collectively (“humanity as all humans”), but at the same time it carries notions of philanthropy and altruism (“humanity as moral sentiment.”). Within the latter meaning the “laws of humanity” and “crimes against humanity” are referred to in international treaties and humanity is cited as a source of international law. Humanity implies a moral force. But how this constrains inhumanity - that invariably involves use of force or acts of armed violence - is unclear.

People who use the words “humanity” and “humanitarian” are often perceived as - or really are – trying to place themselves on a moral high ground. It is unclear whether “humanity as moral sentiment” has been replaced by or integrated into contemporary concepts such as human rights, development, humanitarian intervention and human security. If we look for what is meant by “humanity” which is presented as the first, overarching principle of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, we find an explanation of what is done in the spirit of humanity but not what it is. This impoverishes our interventions and often makes our pleadings appear sentimental, ill-informed and “unrealistic”. We therefore need to take a new look at humanity, what we mean by it, how we talk about it and how it can be used more effectively in dialogue about restraining or prohibiting certain weapons and acts of armed violence and in promoting human well being.

A knowledge-based approach to humanity

The last few hundred years have seen a massive increase in the population of the planet and the organization of “humanity-as-all-humans” into a system of nation-States. In parallel, we have seen remarkable advances in things that shape our existence such as manufacturing technology, commerce, communications, politics, health-care and weapons, to name but a few. In broad terms, the populations of States where there is access to these advances enjoy longer and better lives; the major reason for this is that they enjoy collective security. This security relies on having a legitimate capacity for armed violence either to defend the State (armed forces) or maintain law and order within the State (police) whilst, at the same time, placing great restraints on this capacity. Furthermore situations in which the capacity for armed violence is unrestrained (whether this be use of explosive weapons, displacement of whole populations or torture) is universally considered to be abhorrent (“humanity as moral sentiment”).

In brief it is increasingly recognized, and can be demonstrated by an important body of research, that people’s security is a prerequisite for their health and this applies to all of humanity “humanity as all humans”. This is not an original observation. In 1651, Thomas Hobbes wrote, in effect, that without security, “… there is no place for industry... no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”

“Humanity as moral sentiment” really does exist! It has been made objective in the work of multiple academic disciplines. An innate resistance to killing other humans is well documented (as are different means to overcome this resistance.) Studies of "primitive warfare" reveal that cruelty is not the norm, that fatalities may be few and that the violence is accompanied by much ritual and, importantly, restraint. It has been shown that altruism is a biological phenomenon observable throughout the animal world. Children who are educated to think about the plight of others who suffer some misfortune or cruelty are, in later life, less likely to resolve disputes by resorting to violence. On the negative side, studies have shown how ordinary people can be brought to inflict great pain and suffering on inoffensive strangers. The emotional distance brought by the use of explosive weapons that separate their user and victim in time and space has been explained. In the same vein, there is ample evidence that "dehumanization" of an enemy is an important element in the committing of war crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity; some even argue it's a prerequisite. In brief, “humanity as moral sentiment” and acts of inhumanity by humans are largely explicable in scientific terms and even in terms of our modern insights into evolved biology. An innate morality equips us for living in large groups. (It is shown that chimpanzees express moral sentiments too! Chimpanity!).

A new approach to “humanity” also has implications at the operational level. For example, in the world of global health, a new wind is blowing. This takes the form of rapidly advancing knowledge of the social determinants of health. Understanding the impact on health of education, housing, poverty, lifestyles and, above all, security moves the concern (and responsibility for) people’s health out of a traditional public health domain. This opens the door to tangible evidence-based interventions to improve people’s health without the need for formal health programmes. For example, in many parts of the world, the single most important factor determining whether a child dies in its first few months of life is the level of education of the mother. In a country torn by conflict, the education of girls may be severely repressed. A new approach to “humanity” –with weighty implications for people’s security and health - would bring authority to a claim that a programme targeting female illiteracy is both urgent and pertinent. Such a programme would find its correct place among the competing priorities for “humanitarian action.” Incorporating the social determinants of health into the activities of all components of the Movement is now an imperative.  Without doing so, it is difficult to claim we are well informed or driven by a serious notion of humanity.

 Implications

The dual notions of humanity constantly interact.  The fulcrum of this interaction is the capacity of human beings and human society for armed violence and their capacity to restrain it. “Humanity as moral sentiment” limits, to the greatest extent possible, the effects of armed violence or threat of it on people’s security and health. It restrains the capacity for armed violence so that “humanity as all humans” can live in peaceful, constructive societies in which, for instance, family life, education, commerce and, most importantly, people’s health can flourish.

A definition of humanity combining both notions could read as follows: “With the goal of ensuring peaceful, collective and constructive human existence, humanity requires  the restraint of any capacity for armed violence and limits the effects of armed violence on people’s security and health.”

In light of the above, a new approach to speaking of “humanity” is needed that is in keeping with multiple insights drawn from contemporary knowledge. It should be objective, comprehensible, universal and communicable. It should reveal the common denominator of concern of all “humanitarian actors.” It should reinforce the six other fundamental principles of the Red Cross / Red Crescent Movement. Such an approach would help demonstrate that the Movement (and any other actor invoking a notion of “humanity”) is open and listening to the world (including the world of science and inquiry) and not lofty, sentimental or simply “do-gooders”. This in turn could help engage those from other sectors and help motivate these circles and our own volunteer base, particularly among youth.

How does this new approach to talking about “humanity” help us in real terms? Promoting a well informed dialogue about weapons, violence, health and human well-being based on an objective understanding of humanity could force greater consideration of the vulnerabilities to armed violence of and its impact on people, groups, and communities. It would serve to raise the moral stakes in the humanitarian dialogue and increase the burden of responsibility on the users or potential users of weapons. This would occur because their actions would be discussed and analyzed in terms of what these actions mean for people’s lives and not only whether or not they are illegal. It would underscore the true universality of humanitarian law and human rights law and maintain a focus on the object and purpose of these bodies of law. Most importantly it would help generate a “facts-based” agenda for humanitarian action and assist the Movement in setting priorities.

Time taken for a new look at how we understand and communicate about “humanity” would be time well spent. It could change the international dialogue on the means to constrain armed violence and build healthy, sustainable societies. It permits an action-orientated view of the security and health of people who lack both and for whom life is still … “poor, nasty, brutish and short.”

This is a guest blog contributed by Robin Coupland and Peter Herby.

Previous published thoughts on humanity, health and security by Dr Coupland are:

- “Humanity: what is it and how does it influence international law” International Review of the Red Cross 2001, Vol. 83, No. 844, p.969

- “The Humanity of Humans: Philosophy, Science, Health, or Rights?”

Health and Human Rights 2003, Vol. 7, p.159.

- “Exploring the humanity of humans” The Red Cross / Red Crescent Magazine 2004, Vol. 1, p.26.

- “Security, insecurity and health” Bulletin of the World Health Organisation 2007, Vol. 85, p.181.

Archimedes, one of the leading scientists and inventors in classical antiquity, is said to have remarked of the lever: “Give me a place to stand on, and I will move the Earth”. (The image above is an engraving from Mechanics Magazine published in London in 1824.)

Humanitarian Lens on Nuclear Weapons

There is renewed and deep international concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from the detonation of nuclear weapons in populated areas. Yet 25 years after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence remain central to the security doctrines of a significant number of states. Drawing on a range of perspectives, the volume depicted above explores what viewing nuclear weapons through a humanitarian lens entails, and why it is undergoing such a revival. Recent developments in this respect are examined, as well as what these could mean for nuclear arms control in the near future.

The new publication was launched at UN Headquarters in New York on 16 October 2013.  To read it, use this link.

Tim Caughley and John Borrie, UNIDIR

http://www.unidir.org/NucHumanitarianLens

CD: Face-to-Face

Fifteen years have elapsed since the Conference on Disarmament last engaged in substantive work.  Briefly in August 1998 the CD tried to fulfil a newly agreed mandate to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile material.  Those efforts lasted three weeks.  Since then, negotiations on that issue have never risen beyond a procedural level.  The same is true for the other core agenda items – nuclear disarmament, preventing an arms race in outer space and negative security assurances.

During these barren years, no less than 90 presidents of the conference have grappled with the task of developing a programme of work for dealing with these four topics in a manner that is tolerable to the CD’s membership.  As required by the CD’s rules, the responsibility for chairing the 24-week annual session of the conference changes no less than six times each year. 

Sharing the presidency in alphabetical order of member states may be democratic, but it takes a toll on continuity.  And during this past decade and a half it has also proved a very lonely task.  In the absence of consensus on mandates for getting down to serious work, it has fallen to successive presidents to conduct constant shuttle diplomacy among individual delegations to find a breakthrough.  While those consultations take place off stage, the CD is effectively at a standstill.  Disarmament experts have begun to turn their attention to opportunities offered by new forums and approaches outside the conference.

Recently, the CD took a decision to mitigate both the effects of the discontinuity of the presidency and also its loneliness.  An informal working group has been established to produce the elusive programme of work. 

The duration of the new body will not be constrained by the rapid rotation of presidents.  Even better, as the group is open to all CD members and observers, a more transparent and inclusive process for uncovering and narrowing rooted differences of view should result (although this benefit will be tempered by the apparent exclusion of civil society, again).  Successive presidents will still have a role in conducting private consultations with concerned delegations, but that will no longer be the central dynamic.

One other reflection, in passing, on the rule to confine each CD presidency to four working weeks... If the conference does eventually succeed in elaborating and agreeing a programme of work, the issue of presidential rotation will fall away.  Attention would turn instead to the chairs of the subsidiary bodies established to carry out the real work of the conference.  The chairs of those bodies will become the key actors, and on past practice they won’t – and shouldn’t – be rotated month-by-month.  At that point the CD president’s role will revert largely to a titular one. 

In the meantime, if the informal working group is to salvage the CD’s credibility, it will recognise that its creation has surmounted a current short-coming in the conference’s methods of work.  An obstacle to face-to-face efforts, delegation-to-delegation, to forge the necessary compromises on matters of real substance has been removed. The issue of presidential continuity has been dealt with, and the responsibility for settling the CD's long-standing differences has been placed where it belongs - on the membership as a whole. Let the thawing begin...

Tim Caughley, Resident Senior Fellow, UNIDIR

CD: Three Mysteries

Three aspects of the Conference on Disarmament’s longstanding paralysis are particularly mystifying.

First, despite all the agonising among the 65 CD members about the current deadlock, there has been no emergence of a group of concerned countries to explore a way though the impasse.  Every month a new president alone takes on the responsibility of finding a breakthrough.  Why is this such a lonely task?  Have members tacitly accepted that the CD’s usefulness has come to an end?  After all, 16 years have elapsed since the Conference last fulfilled its mandate as a negotiating body.  If this is not the case, why is there no coordinated activity – sustained across the monthly presidencies – to shore it up? 

The Secretary-General of the Conference, Mr Tokayev, recently proposed the establishment of an informal working group with a mandate to produce a Programme of Work that would lead to negotiations. This idea has struck a chord with a number of member states. It will be interesting to see whether those members actively lobby and meet among themselves - ideally as an informal cross-regional group - to pursue this promising avenue, or whether it is simply left to successive presidents to painstakingly consult on its general acceptability.

Another mysterious aspect of the CD’s malaise is this.  Strong statements are made regularly by members of the Conference about the need to negotiate on the topic to which they attach priority.  The trial of strength over which of the core issues is “ripest” for negotiation amounts to a direct clash of political wills. The result is that there is no agreement on anything. The consensus needed for the Programme of Work and the conduct of negotiations is altogether absent.

Why is this so strange?  Well, take the case of a fissile material negotiation, or “fissban”.  The principal proponents of this issue profess to being frustrated by their inability to re-launch the negotiation that began and prematurely ended in 1998 and has never been resumed.  But what is stopping them from rallying their supporters and conducting a sustained debate in Plenary, focused ideally on a working paper containing a framework or elements of an eventual treaty?  They don’t need a Programme of Work for such an initiative – under the Rules, working in Plenary is the CD’s default option (Rule 18).

Assuming such discussions gather momentum in Plenary and build up the necessary trust along the way, a negotiating mandate will in due course be needed to intensify the work.  And time will have to be allocated to the working group in which the negotiations would be conducted.  So procedural hurdles would still remain.  The CD would, however, have rediscovered the will to work which is currently absent judged by the lack of initiatives of the kind just described.  This should in itself have a cathartic effect. By the way, a “simplified” Programme of Work (see previous postings on this site) would be the obvious vehicle for making time available for the intensified phase of negotiations just noted (to be pursued alongside other business agreed by the Conference).

Finally, it is interesting to speculate why no state has come forward with any concrete working paper on fissile material negotiations in recent years? Draft treaties were tabled in 2006 and 2009 by the US and by Japan and the Netherlands respectively, while Brazil, Canada and Australia each made proposals in 2010.  But since then, there has been nothing quite as specific apart from the working paper of Bulgaria, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Romania, Spain, Sweden and Turkey in June 2011.  The lack of any recent proposal on fissile material  - as a new focus for Plenary debate - is hardly a ringing endorsement of the CD. 

Maybe, as with nuclear disarmament, attention is turning elsewhere. UNOG’s website records that, in advance of the convening in Geneva in 2014 and 2015 of a Group of Government Experts (GGE) on fissile material, 25 states and the EU have recently responded to the UN Secretary-General’s request to submit their views to him on a fissile material ban.  The GGE will proceed on the specific understanding that if the CD meanwhile agrees and implements a programme of Work that includes the negotiation of a fissban, the GGE will cease and any product of its work will be passed on to the CD. 

With very little time left during the current session of the CD for the tabling of concrete proposals on a fissban, let alone a Programme of Work, and in the absence of any member-driven, cross-regional initiative to caucus to overcome the sorry deadlock, these mysteries about getting work underway seem set to remain unsolved.  Yet the solutions aren’t nearly as complicated as the current, discredited efforts to agree fatally-linked, multiple mandates in a single document. Persisting with the latter is the third and most worrisome mystery.

Tim Caughley, Resident Senior Fellow, UNIDIR