The Proverbial Reset Button: Was It Pressed or Stroked in Moscow?

In February, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said that “it’s time to press the reset button” on U.S. relations with Russia he could not have imagined what far-reaching effect his words would have. On March 6, in Geneva, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton presented Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with a palm-sized yellow box with a red “reset button” to symbolize improved ties between the two countries. But something must have been lost in translation – the button had the Russian word peregruzka printed on it, but the Russian word for ‘reset’ is perezagruzka, while peregruzka means ‘overload’ or ‘overcharge’.

Regardless of the dodgy translation, the reset button gimmick in Geneva served its purpose as it allowed for a ceremonial rebooting of relations and expanded, as an inadvertent side effect, a rather limited list of Russian words that are well-known outside the country, such as perestroika, glasnost, vodka, matryoshka, balalaika, sputnik, gulag, and pogrom.

Ever since, the word ‘reset’ (perezagruzka) has often been invoked by the Obama administration when describing what they would like to do regarding U.S.-Russian relations. “What I said coming in is that I wanted to press the reset button on relations between the United States and Russia,” President Barack Obama said in an interview with the Russian media ITAR-TASS/ROSSIYA TV on the eve of his visit to Moscow.

The idea won popularity in Russia as well. On the weekend before President Obama’s visit to Russia the misspelled reset button came to light on Pushkin Square in Moscow – a ten-minute walking distance from the Kremlin – for ordinary people to press. The button was placed on a table between cardboard cutouts of presidents Obama and Medvedev. The “Reset U.S.-Russian relations” event was organized by the Russian official state newspaper Rossiiskaya Gazeta, which borrowed the button from the Russian Foreign Ministry.

So, were U.S.-Russian relations really reset when Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev met in the Kremlin on July 6? Were the heads of the two countries able to eventually press this proverbial perezagruzka button?

It appears that the summit resulted in several vital practical achievements. But at the same time it demonstrated that some substantial disagreements remain.

It seems that the crisis in U.S.-Russian relations – which at the end of the Bush administration were at their worst since the 1990s – has now been overcome. The tone of bilateral dialogue has changed from confrontational rhetoric to pragmatic discussions on issues of primary concern for both nations.

One of the most urgent issues before the two presidents was to achieve progress on a replacement for a vital U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control agreement – the START I treaty that expires this December. The task is a formidable one as the preparation of the START I took nine years, while a “START-Plus” treaty would only have nine months to negotiate after being effectively frozen by the Bush administration. As far as one can judge from the available information, the negotiations have encountered certain difficulties, with U.S. missile defense plans and Russian demands for sharper cuts in strategic delivery vehicles (land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) presenting the key obstacles. Nevertheless in Moscow the presidents signed the Joint Understanding that outlines a new strategic arms control deal at the same time reflecting both mutual agreements and disagreements.

Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed to reduce the number of strategic delivery vehicles to 550-1,100, and the number of their associated warheads to 1,500-1,675. The specific numbers should be agreed on through further negotiations and recorded in the treaty. The warhead range of 1,500-1,675 does not look like a dramatic reduction when compared with the lower limit of 1,700 warheads of the Moscow SORT treaty signed in 2002 by presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin. But the reality is that a START-Plus treaty should be concluded soon, preferably before December 2009, to preserve the verification mechanisms, which otherwise would disappear with the expiration of the START I treaty. The negotiating teams simply do not have the luxury of time to negotiate deeper cuts now. In this regard, the START-Plus treaty could be considered as an important but interim agreement preserving the continuity of the arms control and disarmament process. And, it paves the way for a next agreement that would take more time to negotiate.

The wide range for delivery vehicles – from 500 to 1100 – simply reflects the distinct negotiating positions of the two countries on this issue. The United States reportedly proposed setting the limit at 1100 strategic delivery vehicles while Russia suggested a significantly lower number, probably 500 delivery vehicles. This reflects the current status of strategic forces – the last START count on 1 January 2009 shows that the United States has 1198 strategic delivery vehicles, while Russia has 814. The Russian side is already well below the proposed level of 1100 delivery vehicles, and as Russia continues decommissioning old Soviet-era weapon systems 500 seems a reasonable number for it to suggest.

The presidents and their teams found a rather elegant solution when they included both suggested limits for strategic delivery vehicles in the Joint Understanding on the START follow-on treaty. But this will most certainly be an additional headache for the treaty negotiators who will have to come up with a more definite limit very soon. The number of delivery vehicles may become a major point of contention at the START-plus talks. But there are other difficult issues as well – there is no clarity regarding counting rules and verification procedures. Will a START-plus treaty follow the definitions and counting rules for strategic delivery vehicles and their associated warheads from the START I treaty or will they be modified? Will complex verification procedures from the old treaty be preserved, or will the new treaty opt for some kind of ‘verification lite’? Gary Samore, a U.S. National Security Council official for arms control, recently said that any new U.S.-Russian arms control agreement should “be free of the Cold War burden of intrusive inspections”. How then will this new START-plus treaty differ from the Moscow SORT treaty, which does not envisage any verification at all?

The Joint Understanding on the START follow-on treaty acknowledges “the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms”, which can be considered to be a reference to the Russian concerns with U.S. missile defense plans, especially the third missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. Prior to his visit to Moscow, President Obama gave an interview to an opposition Russian newspaper Novaya gazeta, in which he said “In our meeting in London on April 1st, President Medvedev and I issued a joint statement on instructions for our negotiators for this new treaty. These instructions very explicitly did not mention missile defense as a topic of discussion for these negotiations”. The missile defenses may be another point of contention at the START-plus talks.

It does not seem that the parties are going to drastically change their positions on this issue. In Moscow the presidents signed the Joint Statement on Missile Defense Issues in which they rather vaguely agreed, “to continue the discussion concerning the establishment of cooperation in responding to the challenge of ballistic missile proliferation”. It is unclear right now what practical steps could follow from this statement.

Besides arms control, the United States and Russia agreed on a number of important bilateral issues that will contribute to improved relations between the two countries. For example, Russia will allow the transit of U.S. military personnel and lethal equipment through its territory to Afghanistan. The U.S. and Russian chiefs of staff agreed to resume military-to-military cooperation between the two nations. Moreover, Russia agreed to lift some restrictions on livestock trade with the United States – a market worth $1.3 billion a year.

Presidents Obama and Medvedev decided to create a U.S.-Russian Bilateral Presidential Commission to serve as a new foundation for bilateral cooperation. This commission could actually be a very important development, for it provides different governmental agencies with a direct channel to their counterparts, a facility that was virtually absent during the Bush administration. An interesting thing is that the presidents decided to change the format of this new commission as compared to the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission of the 1990s, which was then co-chaired by the U.S. Vice President and the Russian Premier Minister. The new commission will be chaired by the presidents themselves and its work will be coordinated by Secretary of State Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov. Maybe the heads of states just didn’t want to leave the fate of their new undertaking at disposal of such “tough customers” as Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin. It may be easier to find common ground for Obama and Medvedev, who throughout their summit repeatedly emphasized that they like and trust each other.

For all the upbeat public statements, a pall of disagreement over missile defense, NATO expansion and the situation around Abkhazia and South Ossetia lingered over the Kremlin hall where Obama and Medvedev had a press conference to present the results of their talks. There, President Obama reiterated his “firm belief that Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity must be respected”. His respect for international law can only be admired. But why are the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia more important than, say, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Serbia? And what do we do with the Abkhazians and Ossetians who are not willing to live in one state with the Georgians after suffering through several military conflicts with them?

The spar over Georgia tends to hide broader issues. These include the aspirations of Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO, and what the Russians perceive as American interference in the region.

President Obama did not hint at waiving such Cold War leftover as the Jackson-Vanik Amendment which denies most-favored-nation status to Russia, and serves as a barrier to trade between the two countries. First enacted in 1974, it made normal trade relations with the Soviet Union contingent on free emigration. Russia has now allowed such freedom for years, but the amendment remains in force merely to provide Congress with political leverage over Russia.

In his speech at the New Economic School President Obama said, “America wants a strong, peaceful, and prosperous Russia” and “NATO seeks collaboration with Russia, not confrontation”. Hopefully he will keep his word and practice what he preaches.

The July summit of Presidents Obama and Medvedev certainly was a good start in resetting U.S.-Russian relations. Despite remaining differences it brought important practical results. The future will show whether further steps to create a new model of U.S.-Russian relations will follow.

This is a guest post by Dr. Yury Yudin. Yury is a Senior Researcher at UNIDIR and manages the project ‘Multinational Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle'. His new study paper, 'Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing Proposals' is available in PDF format by clicking here.


Image of 'Cutler Hammer Reset Button' by J L-S retrieved from Flickr.com.

Biden’s speech in Munich: “Press the reset button”, and then what?

From 6 to 8 February 2009, more than a dozen heads of state or government, ministers and scores of international experts met for the 45th Munich Security Conference in Germany. There, U.S. Vice President Joe Biden presented a much-anticipated indication of America’s foreign policy under President Barack Obama’s new administration.

As Russian officials hope that U.S.-Russian relations will improve under Obama’s presidency, the Biden speech would have been keenly examined in Moscow. So what signals did the U.S. Vice President send to Russia from Munich? Actually, nothing very reassuring.

It seems that Vice President Biden in Munich was purposefully vague on many important international issues. His speech contained many hints and some colourful but not too meaningful rhetoric, like this now famous line:

it’s time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia.

If only world matters were as easy to reset as a personal computer! His remarks provided little reassurance on three issues that represent Moscow's main security concerns today: missile defence, NATO expansion, and the aftermath of the Georgian-Russian conflict.

Firstly, Biden said that the U.S. “will continue to develop missile defense”. Even if the rumors are true that President Obama may for some reason postpone the deployment of the third missile defence site in Poland and the Czech Republic, that would in any case not change the equation much: the Eastern European site is not important by itself, but only as an integral part of the whole U.S. missile defence system being developed and fielded, an open multi-tiered system already including land, sea, and space-based components. If, as Biden said, the U.S. will continue to develop this system, it is going to enhance and expand, and today nobody can say how this system will look in 15 or 20 years. Eventually the U.S. missile defense system may reach a level of capability sufficient to seriously undermine the deterrent capability of diminishing Russian nuclear forces. That is why Russian politicians and the country’s military are not reassured: they simply cannot afford not to think about what impact this system may have on Russian security.

Secondly, Biden said, “the United States rejects the notion that NATO’s gain is Russia’s loss [...] We will not recognize any nation having a sphere of influence. It will remain our view that sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and choose their own alliances.” To many Russians, this resembles a double standard. It seems as if Biden’s message was taken from George W. Bush’s playbook, which had strongly advocated further NATO expansion, including admission of countries in Russia’s immediate neighborhood. In Moscow, NATO’s advance to its borders is seen as a direct threat to Russian security.

Biden’s speech signals that the new administration in Washington is not likely to remove its support for further NATO expansion - NATO’s boundaries being viewed by many Russians and others as Washington’s own primary sphere of influence. Perhaps decision makers in Moscow can draw some relief from the realization apparent among some European leaders that, having witnessed Georgia’s military campaign in South Ossetia, which prompted a strong response from Moscow last August, and the latest gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia that left European countries without fuel this January, Ukrainian and Georgian membership of NATO in the foreseeable future may not be such a great idea.

Thirdly, the U.S. Vice President said “the United States will not recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states”. Nobody is going to dispute the sovereign right of the United States to recognize those states it so chooses. But, in my view, hearing from Washington a balanced political assessment of the conflict between Georgia and Russia last August (that is, one more sympathetic to Moscow’s interests) would substantially contribute to “resetting” U.S.-Russian relations.

So, is there a bright side? Biden proposed “to negotiate deeper cuts in both our [nuclear] arsenals.” This is a good idea that should only be welcomed. But nuclear disarmament cannot, and does not, exist in a vacuum. It is a part of a broader political picture, and negotiating partners should take into account their differing security concerns. Otherwise disarmament processes are either doomed to failure, or come to resemble Gorbachev’s disastrous policies of perestroika and “new thinking” in which the Soviet Union made one major concession after another, but got nothing in exchange but ephemeral talks about “new world order”, “globalization” and “acceptance into the club of civilized states”. The size of Russian and American nuclear arsenals were slashed at the end of the Cold War, but in my view no long-term gains in security were achieved by Russia in this process. The U.S. even violated a gentlemen’s agreement that NATO wouldn’t expand to Russia’s borders if the Soviet Union withdrew from Eastern Europe.

It still remains to be seen what the foreign policy of the Obama administration will be and how U.S.-Russian relations will develop. As the saying goes, “hope dies last”, so maybe the Biden speech was not a declaration of future policies simply perpetuating the ones of the previous U.S. administration, but a prelude to more innovative strategies to build better relations between the two countries.

This is a guest post by Dr. Yury Yudin. Yury is a Senior Researcher at UNIDIR and manages the project ‘Multinational Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle'.

Photo Credit: 'Reset' by Tomás Rotger on Flickr.

Reading the Tea Leaves: Obama and Cluster Bombs

What will US President Obama do about cluster bombs? The new administration announced immediate changes in some defense and national security related matters, most notably on interrogation methods and the closing of Guantanamo Bay detention center within the next year. No such quick action on cluster munitions took place, however. For clues about future action, we can look at President Obama’s voting record as a Senator, positions taken after the campaign, and the orientation of his senior and midlevel appointments in national security positions.

Obama’s Record in the Senate

In September 2006, Senator Obama voted for Senator Feinstein’s proposed amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill:

No funds appropriated or otherwise made available by this Act may be obligated or expended to acquire, utilize, sell, or transfer any cluster munition unless the rules of engagement applicable to the cluster munition ensure that the cluster munition will not be used in or near any concentrated population of civilians, whether permanent or temporary, including inhabited parts of cities or villages, camps or columns of refugees or evacuees, or camps or groups of nomads.

The amendment failed by a vote of 70-30. The proposal was certainly a modest one and came before the ban movement got traction, but that the future President was willing to take a positive stand is certainly an encouraging sign. While the focus of this blog is on the Obama administration, it should be noted that the US Congress is likely to consider similar legislation again this year.

After the Election

Following the election and on the eve of the signing of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in Oslo, a spokesperson for the incoming President gave the following statement:

President-elect Obama is deeply concerned about the well-being of civilians in situations of conflict, as reflected by his support of the legislation in 2006 that would have prohibited the use of cluster munitions near concentrations of civilians. As president, he will carefully review the new treaty and work closely [with] other countries to ensure that the United States is doing everything feasible to promote protection of civilians in conflict.

Not a resounding endorsement of the Oslo treaty, but it holds some promise.

Do Obama’s cabinet and staff picks give us any clues?

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton voted against the September 2006 Feinstein amendment. As did Joe Biden (now the Vice President) and another cabinet member, Ken Salazar (now Secretary of the Interior). More recently, written questions about the broad principles that are likely to guide the Obama Administration’s policy review on cluster munitions were put to her as a part of Secretary of State confirmation procession in the US Senate. The written response was as follows:

The incoming Administration has not taken a position on the new cluster bomb treaty. I look forward to working with the President-elect and the rest of the national security team on this issue in order to develop a policy that upholds our moral obligations while protecting our troops. The new Administration will carefully review the treaty in consultation with military commanders and work closely with our friends and allies to ensure that the United States is doing everything feasible to promote protection of civilians - especially children.

In the words of one observer close to the process: “they punted.”

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ position on cluster munitions, while he was serving at the pleasure of President Bush is well known. On June 19, 2008, after the CCM had been adopted but not signed, Gates issued a new Department of Defense Policy on cluster munitions. That policy, in part, states that:

DoD recognizes that blanket elimination of cluster munitions is unacceptable due not only to negative military consequences but also due to potential negative consequences for civilians. Large-scale use of unitary weapons, as the only alternative to achieve military objectives, could result, in some cases, in unacceptable collateral damage and explosive remnants of war (ERW) issues.

President Obama decided to retain Gates as Defense Secretary. Will it be President Obama’s pleasure to change Gates’ mind?

National Security Advisor James Jones, Jr. is a retired marine who began his career as a platoon leader in Vietnam. In the late 1990s, he served as a military assistant to President Clinton’s Defense Secretary William Cohen.

It’s not clear how much he was involved in the formulation of the now abandoned Cohen policy on cluster munitions, which required all cluster munitions produced after 2005 to have a failure rate of no more than 1%.

US Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice was on the National Security Council (NSC) staff as Director for International Organizations and Peacekeeping and then became Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs during the Clinton Administration. Eventually, she moved over to the State Department as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.

When the Eritrea/Ethiopia War broke out in 1998 , she was tasked with trying to negotiate a settlement. She likely remembers the carnage caused when the Eritrean air force dropped cluster bombs on Mekele, Ethiopia in the opening days of that conflict. In 1999, Rice co-wrote an op-ed piece in the International Herald Tribune castigating the conduct of the Sudanese government against its own people.

Rice is certainly no John Bolton (the former US ambassador to the UN who openly disdained the organization – he was eventually replaced by Zalmay Khalilzad), and will take a much more multilateral approach to issues. Being in New York may limit her impact on conventional arms control issues, though.

Mid Level Appointments

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn has been the Senior Vice President for Government Operations and Strategy at Raytheon. Prior to that he has served in a variety of DoD positions. Raytheon manufactures various versions of the Joint Stand Off Weapon (JSOW), a “precision attack glide bomb”. Among the payloads for the JSOW are both the BLU-97 CEM bomblets (tagged as one of the “dirty dozen” cluster munitions by Human Rights Watch) and Textron’s Sensor Fuzed Weapon.

Lynn’s confirmation ran into a snag because of the new president’s ethics rules that “ban lobbyists who join his administration for two years from working on issues they were previously involved with.” Not to worry – President Obama waived that rule for Lynn.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, president and co-founder of the Center for a New American Security, is counted among the “counterinsurgents”. She held several positions in the Clinton administration (including Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy). She does not appear to have directly addressed the issue of cluster munitions, but an approach that stresses connecting with local populations would likely place a premium on reducing harm to civilians. In a piece published in October of 2008, Flournoy and Shawn Brimley called on “the new civilian leadership in the Pentagon” to “adopt an ethic of responsible stewardship.”

Department of Defense General Counsel Jeh Charles Johnson has been a partner at the DC office of the Paul Weiss law firm. Beginning in 1998, he served for 27 months as General Counsel to the Department of the Air Force. In that position he very likely had to consider the legality of the use of cluster munitions, as the weapon was used extensively by the USAF in the Kosovo campaign. Johnson is certainly a change from William Haynes III, his predecessor, who has been seen as one of the most aggressive defenders of the Bush era interrogation policies.

Deputy Secretary of State for Policy Jim Steinberg served as Deputy National Security Advisor under Clinton from 1996 to 2000, covering the time of the Kosovo campaign. He held other positions in the State Department and served as Director of Foreign Policy Studies at the Brooking Institution. Along with Kurt Campbell, Steinberg recently launched a book entitled Difficult Transitions: Foreign Policy Troubles at the Outset of Presidential Power in which they caution against quick changes in policy, but also the need to consult with allies.

So, what does all this reading of the tea leaves tell us?

Unlike the immediate decisions to reverse Bush administration policies on torture and the Guantanamo Bay Detention Center, no such quick turnaround in policy will likely result on cluster munitions unless there is considerable pressure to do so. That said, there is a general sense of “out with the old and in with the new.” The new administration is committed to multilateralism and listening in a way not usually associated with the Bush administration, so there is room for strong NATO proponents of the CCM to make an impact. The decision makers discussed above at least on the surface appear to have a greater respect for the opinions of their military counterparts. If US allies who are supporters of the Oslo Treaty are to have a positive impact, they will need to be working at convincing not only civilians in the new administration, but also their US military colleagues.

This is a guest blog by Virgil Wiebe, Director of Clinical Education and Associate Professor at the University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis.

Photo: ‘Paragon Fortune Telling Teacup’ by Beads by Laura on Flickr.