This is one of two posts of remarks at a side-event
organised during the NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting by the HiroshimaPrefecture, UNIDIR and SIPRI on 2 May 2017 in Vienna. One post contains a
summary of a paper by Ambassador Paul Meyer (retired) of Canada. The second
summarises a paper written by Professor Nick Ritchie of York University,
England. Full versions of the papers will appear on UNIDIR’s website.
Begins: In
recent years, the debate on nuclear weapons has been dominated by differences
over both the pace of disarmament and how to accelerate it. A humanitarian
focus on the risks and consequences of a nuclear conflict or an accidental
detonation has accentuated the need for taking nuclear disarmament forward. As
we know, the means for doing so, however, are highly disputed including amongst
the parties to the NPT.
Acutely aware of the humanitarian impacts and risks of
nuclear detonations, the Hiroshima Prefecture has been active in canvassing
ways to nurture a bridging of the longstanding divide between nuclear
weapon-possessing states and non-nuclear weapon states. UNIDIR welcomes the
opportunity to work with the Prefecture in this bridge-building role. The first
paper of this collaboration between the Hiroshima Prefecture and UNIDIR offers
two perspectives aimed at encouraging a greater understanding of points of view
that will need to be taken into account if the common goal of the eventual
elimination of nuclear armaments is to be achieved.
The second paper was contributed by Professor Nick
Ritchie of the University of York. His paper weighs questions about the
effectiveness of a treaty prohibiting the possession and use of nuclear weapons
(i.e., a ‘ban treaty”). Noting that most of the nuclear-armed nations are
currently opposed to such a treaty, along with most of the United States’
nuclear allies, he observes that, ultimately, nuclear disarmament can occur only
when the nuclear-possessors have dismantled and disposed of their nuclear
weapons in a voluntary process. Nevertheless, actions take place not in a
vacuum but in particular political and historical contexts and the chief
purpose of the humanitarian initiative and a ban treaty, he sees, as being to
change the global political context of nuclear weapons. By ‘political context’
Ritchie is referring to the prevailing set of norms, rules, practices and
discourses that shape how we think about and act in relation to nuclear
weapons.
Ritchie views the primary changes sought by advocates
of a ban treaty as being twofold:
(i) the ‘delegitimation’ and stigmatisation of nuclear
weapons based on the risks of nuclear use and the unacceptable humanitarian
effects of nuclear violence; and (ii) a shifting of the centre of power in
nuclear disarmament diplomacy away from the agency of nuclear-armed states and
their relationships with each other and towards the collective agency of
non-nuclear-weapon states that foreswore the possession of nuclear arms under
the NPT. This shift he attributes to frustration with the slow pace of nuclear
disarmament.
In Ritchie’s view, the effect of a stigmatising move
by a majority of states would neither be immediate nor direct. A direct effect
would require the participation of one or more nuclear-armed states in the
negotiation process leading to a strategic decision to disarm and begin a
process of dismantling nuclear weapons and production complexes—not something
that is currently in prospect. The effect of a ban treaty would therefore be
indirect through changing the global context of nuclear weapons by establishing
and legitimising a new political reality, and through challenging established
ways of thinking about nuclear weapons and security and the relationships and
practices that sustain them. He sees the intention of proponents of a ban
treaty as being to increase the costs of trying to legitimise nuclear weapons
in global politics in order to induce change in the policies and practices of
the nuclear-armed. A ban’s impact would be felt as part of a broader set of
‘effective measures’ to develop a universal prohibition regime that will have
to include robust verification of demilitarised nuclear programmes.
In summary, this paper and the accompanying one by Ambassador
Paul Meyer serve the intended purpose of an initial summarising of perspectives
that will need to be understood and recognised in any dialogue to bridge the
gap between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. The papers both recognise
that there are other, competing viewpoints to accommodate. Understanding all
positions is essential to accommodating them. Exchanging views on ways and
means of reconciling various perspectives on nuclear disarmament will form the
basis of further collaboration by UNIDIR and the Hiroshima Prefecture towards
bridge building. It is our hope that in the meantime there will develop an
increased realisation on all sides that talking to each other needs to replace
talking at—or past—each other, that is, understanding the differences first,
reconciling them where possible, and concentrating on identifying and building
on common ground. Ends
Tim Caughley
Resident Senior Fellow
UNIDIR
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