This is one of two posts of remarks at a side-event
organised during the NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting by the HiroshimaPrefecture, UNIDIR and SIPRI on 2 May 2017 in Vienna. One post contains a
summary of a paper by Ambassador Paul Meyer (retired) of Canada. The second
summarises a paper written by Professor Nick Ritchie of York University,
England. Full versions of the papers will appear on UNIDIR’s website.
Begins: In
recent years, the debate on nuclear weapons has been dominated by differences
over both the pace of disarmament and how to accelerate it. A humanitarian
focus on the risks and consequences of a nuclear conflict or an accidental
detonation has accentuated the need for taking nuclear disarmament forward. As
we know, the means for doing so, however, are highly disputed including amongst
the parties to the NPT.
Acutely aware of the humanitarian impacts and risks of
nuclear detonations, the Hiroshima Prefecture has been active in canvassing
ways to nurture a bridging of the longstanding divide between nuclear
weapon-possessing states and non-nuclear weapon states. UNIDIR welcomes the
opportunity to work with the Prefecture in this bridge-building role. The first
paper of this collaboration between the Hiroshima Prefecture and UNIDIR offers
two perspectives aimed at encouraging a greater understanding of points of view
that will need to be taken into account if the common goal of the eventual
elimination of nuclear armaments is to be achieved.
The first of the two papers was contributed by former
Ambassador Paul Meyer of Canada. Ambassador Meyer’s paper notes the perilous
nature of the current international security context and inherent proliferation
risks in Asia and Europe. He observes also that the inability to convene the
conference on the Middle East WMD-free zone that was promised at the 2010 NPTReview Conference has weakened the authority of the NPT, a key bulwark of
non-proliferation. Avoiding a reversion to a second cold war or a breakdown in
the global non-proliferation regime embodied in that Treaty (or both) will
require some dedicated corrective action on the part of nuclear weapon states
and non nuclear weapon states alike. This would require:
·
a critical assessment of the
efficacy of nuclear deterrence;
·
a fuller consideration of
providing extended deterrence without reliance on nuclear weapons; and
·
a determined politico-diplomatic
strategy to reinvigorate the global machinery for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament.
His paper considers each of those elements in turn.
Meyer observes that nuclear weapons have been
described as ‘the great equalizer’ in contemporary security affairs—that they
can be seen as providing a comparatively small state (e.g., North Korea) with a
defence against a militarily superior adversary by threatening a devastating
blow that would outweigh the benefits that such an adversary could hope to
achieve. He notes, however, some limits to the deterrence doctrine and suggests
that the assumption that the mere possession of nuclear weapons provides an
effective deterrent for the possessing state is not borne out historically.
Meyer writes that
proponents of the abolition of nuclear weapons need to consider
alternatives to nuclear deterrence in
a world still marked by armed conflicts. He notes that the specific military
objectives traditionally assigned to nuclear forces are increasingly vulnerable
to a new generation of conventional weaponry.
Indisputably the road to a world without nuclear weapons will be a long
and winding one. It will require the vision to identify a way forward despite
the current strategic environment.
Meyer concludes that In the near term the restoration
of basic solidarity within the NPT community is a pre-condition for advancing
both the goal of transcending reliance on nuclear deterrence and progressing
towards a world without nuclear weapons and towards also the non-proliferation
imperative that the five nuclear weapon states and their allies prioritise.
In summary, this paper and the accompanying one by Professor
Nick Ritchie serve the intended purpose of an initial summarising of
perspectives that will need to be understood and recognised in any dialogue to
bridge the gap between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. The papers both
recognise that there are other, competing viewpoints to accommodate.
Understanding all positions is essential to accommodating them. Exchanging
views on ways and means of reconciling various perspectives on nuclear
disarmament will form the basis of further collaboration by UNIDIR and the
Hiroshima Prefecture towards bridge building. It is our hope that in the
meantime there will develop an increased realisation on all sides that talking
to each other needs to replace talking at—or past—each other, that is, understanding
the differences first, reconciling them where possible, and concentrating on
identifying and building on common ground. Ends
Tim Caughley
Resident Senior Fellow
UNIDIR
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