1 The agenda of the CD covers some of the world’s most important
security issues—nuclear disarmament; prohibiting the production of fissile
material for use in nuclear weapons; preventing an arms race in outer space;
agreeing on legally-effective means to assure non-nuclear-weapon states that
nuclear weapons will not be used against them. These matters are also known as
the four core issues of the CD.
2 The CD has made no concrete progress in dealing with these issues
(or anything else) since 1996 when the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) were concluded.
3 The CD was established by the UN General Assembly as a negotiating
body, not a deliberative (or ‘talk-shop’) forum. It has failed to fulfil its
mandate for over 20 years. Its role as a standing body of the international
disarmament community has thus atrophied. Disarmament negotiations have found
new or alternative negotiating vehicles and institutions—UN General Assembly
(Arms Trade Treaty; treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons) and treaty bodies
(Anti-Personnel Landmines Convention; Cluster Munitions Convention).
4 In terms of the CD’s failings, the Conference is not
under-resourced. It has a budget for 30 hours every week of fully serviced
meetings with simultaneous interpretation into the 6 UN languages for 24 weeks
a year.
5 And the Conference has ‘workable’ rules of procedures (RoP) that,
although somewhat idiosyncratic, have adequately met the needs of the CD (and
its predecessors) during successful negotiations of the past (for example, the
NPT, ENMOD, Seabed Treaty, BTWC, CWC and the CTBT.)
6 The RoP are workable if the 65 states that are members of the
Conference want to get down to work. There are, however, some
constraints. As all CD decisions must be taken by consensus, the formal
opposition of just one state can block a decision. And every year, work only
begins if no state prevents agreement on the proposed schedule of activities
for the annual session (the so-called ‘programme of work’). The more
complicated the programme of work, the greater the likelihood that one or more
states will oppose it. With three very short-lived exceptions (in 1998 (twice)
and 2009), no programme of work has secured consensus since the decision in
August 1993 on the mandate for the CTBT negotiations (CD/1212).
7 The draft work programmes that have failed to achieve agreement or
implementation for two decades now have been unnecessarily complicated. Rather than follow earlier CD practice of
simply setting out a schedule of activities for the year ahead, for 20 years
the programmes have also incorporated mandates for negotiating or otherwise
dealing with all four of the core issues, to zero effect. Such mandates are
indispensible, but there is nothing in the rules of procedure that requires
them to be set out in the annual work programme.
8 This unfortunate current practice is not just complicated. It has
the effect of holding work on any one of the four mandates hostage to each of
the other three. A state that blocks consensus on the programme of work because
of its opposition to one of the four mandates, prevents work taking place not
only on any of the mandates but on the annual schedule of activities embodying
the mandates.
9 This extraordinary state of affairs is not an accident. Some
members regard it as a symptom of the tense global security environment, which
is inhibiting progress on these kinds of issues. If this is so, then the CD
should operate merely on an as-needs basis, re-convening only when there is a
demonstrable new and promising development. Other states, however, believe that
the Conference depends for its existence on being able to make a difference in
times of global tension, the more so in the light of the relevance of the four
core issues on its agenda. In relation to nuclear disarmament, for example, the
words of the previous UN Secretary-General come to mind: “Some may claim that
security conditions today are not ripe for the pursuit of further nuclear
disarmament. I say this view has it completely backwards. The pursuit of arms
control and disarmament is precisely how we can break the tension and reduce conflicts.”
10 After 20 years of empty returns on its annual investment of 24
weeks, the CD’s integrity is dependent on it finally acknowledging either that its impasse is—and is likely
to remain—chronic, or that a new
beginning is required. If the 2017 session is to arrest the CD’s decline, it
should aim for a straightforward, business-like programme of work simply
setting out a schedule of activities for the year. That schedule should
foreshadow immediate negotiations on an individual core issue (or issues), or
an emerging issue, to get the Conference going again. In short, rebuilding
confidence and credibility from a less convoluted platform will require going
back to the basics of the CD’s heyday. Otherwise, the sense that the Conference
has become anachronistic - powerless to make a difference in addressing today’s
international security challenges, may intensify.
Tim Caughley
Resident Senior Fellow
UNIDIR
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