The study’s main findings are
as follows:
1. The current level of awareness within the humanitarian system is generally low about the specificities of nuclear weapon detonation events or its ability to respond to them.
2. For
the UN to offer or be called on to coordinate humanitarian
assistance suggests an event is already beyond the capacity of the state or
states affected to respond effectively to assist the victims. Moreover, as a
rule it would depend upon an affected state requesting it, or on the existence of appropriate
international decision-making if the government of that state had been incapacitated by the event.
3. The
UN is unlikely to be able to offer much humanitarian assistance in
the immediate aftermath of a nuclear weapon detonation, and it would take time
for the humanitarian system to deploy.
4. At
present there are a number of foreseeable challenges to the prompt and effective
use of the humanitarian cluster system in the event of a nuclear weapon
detonation.
5. Threat
or fear of further nuclear weapon detonation events could vastly complicate
decision-making about the nature and scale of humanitarian coordination and
response, let alone its delivery.
6. Prevention
is the best approach to the possibility of nuclear weapon detonation events. Those humanitarian actors in a position to do so,
such as the UN, should plan for the likely challenges of “lower end”
nuclear weapon detonations even if such a response is palliative. Such
planning would, in reality, also reinforce the need for action to reduce the
risk of nuclear detonations happening in the first place.
The study suggests that the
humanitarian system consider the following:
1. Giving
focused attention to the issue in the UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC);
2. Assigning
responsibility to a new or existing IASC task team, and inviting the
Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE) to
participate in the task team’s work;
3. Studying
and simulating varied nuclear weapon detonation scenarios with a view to
humanitarian response preparedness;
4. Including
representative nuclear detonation scenarios in future revisions of humanitarian
procedures for large, complex, sudden-onset disasters; and
5. Reviewing
current capacities and plans.
For their part, states and the UN Secretary-General could consider:
1. Prompting
relevant humanitarian agencies and specialized agencies such as the IAEA, WHO,
and CTBTO to clarify their mandates, policies, roles, and capabilities with a
view to responding to nuclear weapon detonations;
2. Accounting
for how inter-state decision-making processes could impinge on timely
activation of humanitarian coordination and response efforts in the event of
nuclear detonation; and
3. Examining
how eliminating the risk of nuclear weapon use can be better pursued through
practical measures. While nuclear weapons exist, the risk of their detonation
does too, whether caused deliberately or inadvertently.
Humanitarianism marks the
broader mission of the United Nations, and since its inception the Organization has taken a
strong stand in favour of nuclear disarmament. The initiation of specific
planning for how to respond to a nuclear weapon detonation would appear to be
logical and consistent with both these aims. The development of necessary
understandings about decision-making and a protocol for planning can be based
on existing humanitarian coordination practices and need not require sizeable resources. The rapid mounting of a well-coordinated response will have an
impact in reducing the level of human suffering, even if it may not assist
those directly affected in the immediate aftermath.
John Borrie and Tim Caughley
An earlier UNIDIR publication, “Viewing Nuclear Weapons through a Humanitarian Lens” edited by Borrie and Caughley, can also be found on the Institute’s website.
An earlier UNIDIR publication, “Viewing Nuclear Weapons through a Humanitarian Lens” edited by Borrie and Caughley, can also be found on the Institute’s website.
