The report (CD/2033) of the chair of the
Conference of Disarmament’s informal working group on the vexed question of the
CD’s programme of work is commendably concise. Perhaps too concise. One of its
conclusions appears to run together a number of separate issues.
The text in question says this: “The focus on
the core agenda items should remain as a priority in order to find a consensus
formula for a comprehensive and balanced programme of work” (paragraph 6 (a)).
Let’s break this down in terms
of the CD’s rules of procedure:
- The four core
issues will require—if negotiations on each of them are to be
undertaken—negotiating mandates individually or collectively.
- But there is no requirement that those mandates be
incorporated in the programme of work.
- Nor is there
any requirement that the programme of work be “comprehensive and balanced”. This is simply code for linking all
four negotiating mandates together so that none is agreed until all are agreed
(in the time-honoured way of multilateral diplomacy).
The Conference is making things very hard for
itself in the following ways:
- Its programme of work
need be no more than a schedule of activities.
- The
negotiation of mandates can simply be listed as an item on that schedule, with
an appropriate allocation of time.
- Lumping
together the four core issues (dealing with nuclear disarmament, a fissile
material ban, preventing an arms race in outer space, and multilaterally agreed
negative security assurances) constitutes a hugely indigestible feast of work. Even if negotiating mandates on those
topics can be agreed, imagine the difficulty of finding consensus on the sequence in which they should be negotiated. Negotiating them more or less
simultaneously would be beyond the means of all but the largest delegations.
A short look at
the history of the CD (repeated from earlier posts on this site) puts this
mis-application of the rules of procedure in context:
The Rules of Procedure, as well as CD/1036 (a decision on the “Improved and
Effective Functioning” of the Conference adopted on 21 August 1990), envisage a
streamlined approach whereby the programme of work would be no more than a mere
schedule of business rather than an overarching mandate or mandates for
beginning to elaborate a treaty or a politically binding text on one or more of
the core issues.
Decision CD/1036 led to the current rule on the work
programme, rule
28, with its emphasis on establishing rather than adopting. This is
not a matter of semantics. It means that having established through his or her
consultations that no reasonable objection exists to the schedule of business
(i.e., work programme) for the year, the Conference president would get work
underway without a formal decision. In theory, the work programme, shorn of
mandates, would be so simple as not to require a formal, consensus decision of
the Conference. It would be
wiser, however, to establish formally by a decision of the CD that there was no
objection to this course of action (i.e., consensus).
Returning to
successful approaches prior to 1999 would involve the following:
1. In the
opening days of the annual session, there would be an allocation of time to be
spent on each of the 4 core issues and other substantive agenda items. That schedule or timetable would also
allocate space for the annual high-level segment and for agreeing the CD’s
report to the UN General Assembly. In
addition, it would reserve time for discussion of the outcomes of its work especially on mandates.
2. In the
course of its work on the core issues, the central matter for CD members to
resolve would be: under rule
23 of the Rules of Procedure, is there a need to establish a subsidiary
body in which engagement would be intensified? That is, does a basis exist for
the negotiation of “a draft treaty or other draft texts”? Note that a subsidiary body is
generally regarded as being more appropriate for facilitating intense
engagement than the comparatively stilted, formal option of conducting work in
plenary, although under the Rules, plenary meetings are the default option.
3. As, when and
if the questions arising under rule 23 are answered in the affirmative, members
would immediately apportion time from the reserved allocation (see 1. above)
for the negotiation of the necessary mandate(s).
4. Agreement on
the negotiated mandates would require consensus. For so long as Members insist
on linkages among the four core issues, agreement on mandates is most unlikely
to be achieved individually. The
timetable would need to be flexible enough to deal with the reality that a package deal would thus need to be developed.
The key
difference from the present situation is that work on the mandates would be
taking place under an agreed, streamlined work programme within the rules
constituting a schedule of activities shorn of negotiating mandates. With the
work progamme blockage removed, the beginnings of a basis of trust might be
regenerated. The focus would turn to determining whether a basis exists for
developing a negotiating mandate, issue by issue, and hence for setting up
subsidiary bodies and tackling issues of substance rather than procedure. The
CD’s sense of purpose as a negotiating body would be restored.
It remains to
be seen, however, whether the weight of a linked set of negotiating mandates
will ultimately sink the Conference. There is a way, however, if there’s a will…
Tim Caughley
Resident
Senior Fellow
