These are some notes that formed the basis
of a talk on the Conference on Disarmament to the UN Disarmament Fellows on 21
August 2017.
1. In 1978, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) established
the CD as a ‘single multilateral disarmament
negotiating forum of the international community’ (see para 120 of the report of the First Special Session on Disarmament (UNSSOD-1)). It is a ‘single’ forum in
the sense that it is a standing body with its own secretariat that can conduct
negotiations sequentially on agreed topics. In that sense it is a convenient
venue for disarmament negotiations, but it is not an exclusive one—it is NOT
the ‘sole’ forum.
2. The CD was set up as a ‘negotiating body’.
This is in contrast to the UN Disarmament Commission and the First Committee of the UNGA that are ‘deliberative’ forums—venues for developing understandings at most rather than legally-binding treaties. The last negotiations carried out in the
CD were from 1994 to 1996 to develop a treaty banning the testing of nuclear
weapons (CTBT). Since then, the Conference has briefly begun negotiations on
banning fissile material and on negative security assurances (both in 1998) but
neither negotiation was sustained beyond that year. Increasingly, States have
turned to alternative forums – UNGA (e.g., for the ATT, FMCT and TPNW), Diplomatic
Conferences (APMBC and CCM).
3. The CD is a negotiating forum of limited
membership (65 States). UNSSOD-1 attached ‘great importance’ to the participation
of all the nuclear-weapon States. To ensure this, decision-making has to be by
consensus (i.e., the absence of a formal objection). This avoids situations,
for example, where those States would find themselves in a minority, out-voted
on matters affecting nuclear weapons. The consensus rule in the CD is not in
itself the reason for the CD’s longstanding deadlock. But because consensus is the
sole decision-making rule, there is a responsibility on all members to apply it
in a principled way. It should not be treated as a blunt veto but should be used
sparingly, ideally only in situations where genuine and exhaustive efforts to
seek consensus have been made and where a State’s national interests would be
palpably jeopardized. In any event, the difficulty of separating substance from
procedure in relation to the weighty security topics on the CD’s
agenda means that it is unlikely that members would agree to finessing the
consensus rule in any way far less incorporating additional decision-making
rules.
4. The
terms of reference of the CD include practically all multilateral arms control
and disarmament problems. Currently the CD primarily concentrates on four
‘core’ issues:
- banning the production of fissile material
for use in nuclear weapons (FM(C)T);
- preventing an arms race in outer
space (PAROS); and
- assuring non-nuclear-weapon States
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (NSAs).
The terms of reference of the CD should
not to be confused with its annual agenda, or with the Programme of Work (PoW) which
is required to be negotiated and adopted at the beginning of each year (Rule 28).
5. The Rules of Procedure of the CD are
sometimes blamed for inhibiting the Conference. But the problem is less the rules
themselves—after all, they served satisfactorily in the past—and more the
manner in which the members choose to apply them. For instance, throughout
these past 20 unproductive years the practice of linking mandates for dealing
with all four core issues within a single Programme of Work is at odds with the
rules. The PoW needs be no more than a schedule of activities - there is no
need for it to embody any mandates let alone linking all four where, given the consensus rule, if there's a formal objection to one of the mandates in the PoW they all fail. Mandates, of course, are required for each negotiation the CD launches, but they don't have to be actually incorporated in the PoW.
6. During debates in the CD, States often
lament the ‘absence of political will’ amongst members. But the problem is the
clashing of political wills, not their absence. Some States want action and progress,
but others prefer the status quo. Traditionally, security issues take time to
negotiate. Sadly, however, efforts to recognise and overcome the clash of wills
have been fitful and feeble. Hesitant attempts have been made to move away from PoWs that link all four core issues, to change the focus of the Conference to
new issues, to intensify discussions via an informal Working Group on the way ahead, etc. These attempts have yet to bear fruit.
If the CD is to prosper once again, members are faced with a
more existential choice. Is the CD going to surrender in effect to
irrelevance in the face of the challenge of negotiating in a highly
disturbed global security environment? Or is it going to respond to that challenge
by getting back to basics:
- acknowledging that the longstanding and
stale clash of political wills is bankrupting the legitimacy of the CD;
- interpreting the RoP constructively rather
than the reverse;
- accepting that active diplomacy amongst the
members is urgently required to find mechanisms for re-building long-lost trust
and confidence—mechanisms for staggering the attention of the CD on its core
issues rather than trying to deal with them simultaneously, mechanisms for
developing pre-negotiations on technical issues and matters of definition, etc:
- recognising that the task of restoring confidence requires accepting the realities of the consensus rule while at the
same time insulating it from abuse; and
- being always mindful that the advantages of
existing as a single (but not sole) multilateral
disarmament negotiating forum of the international community will continue to
atrophy as negotiations take place elsewhere and the CD’s stature diminishes.
In short, the 'rationality and diplomatic solutions' sought of the CD by the UN Secretary-General at the outset of this year's session remain in urgent need of application.
Tim Caughley
Resident Senior Fellow
UNIDIR
UNIDIR
