Future perspectives for nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation.
The immediate future for multilateral nuclear disarmament is
difficult to predict. There are only two certainties. The first is that the global security
environment will remain a complicating factor for making real progress on
nuclear disarmament. The second is that
a new review cycle for the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will begin in
May 2017, building up to 2020 and the 50th anniversary of
entry-into-force of the treaty that year. It can confidently be said that of
the three pillars of the NPT all parties retain a strong interest in sustaining
two of them, the proliferation and peaceful use pillars. However, efforts to
agree effective measures for shoring up the shaky third pillar—on nuclear
disarmament—are, for the meantime, taking place in a parallel forum, an Open-ended
Working Group (OEWG) established by the UN General Assembly. Those efforts are
intensifying despite—or perhaps because of—the highly unsettled international
security environment.
For the rest, the future can only be a matter of further speculation:
1. In the NPT review, what
will be the attitude of nuclear-weapon states (NWS) to the sharpening focus on
the nuclear disarmament pillar of the NPT in the OEWG?
2. And in the immediate future,
what will be the outcome of the work of the OEWG when it meets again this
August to agree its report and make recommendations to the 71st
session of the UN General Assembly?
3. Equally, what will be the
outcomes of any initiatives in the General Assembly this October to reconvene
the OEWG or any other new group or negotiation that may be set up by UNGA71?
4. For instance, will UNGA71
agree on a new process stemming from one or other of two proposals made during
the OEWG’s May for negotiations on a prohibition of nuclear weapons. One
proposal was tabled by the entire group of Latin American and Caribbean
states (CELAC). The other came from a cross-regional group (including 3 states
from this region [i.e., Asia])?
5. Will states that do not
support such a negotiation participate in it? The dynamic that might unfold could
take this form: there could be pressure from nuclear-weapons states on their
allies and friends not to participate.
On the other hand, there would be pressure from civil society on
non-nuclear weapon states, including those that are allied to NWS, to attend
and to press for a prohibition even if the NWS did not participate.
In any event, future perspectives are necessarily of a speculative nature at this stage.
Answers
to pre-submitted questions covered the following points during the Hiroshima public
meeting:
The
latest meeting of the OEWG took place in May 2016. What is the significance of
these sessions?
The
significance lies in the fact that are taking place:
i)
under UNGA rules of procedure (in which voting can occur if consensus is absent);
ii)
in parallel to forums that have proved to be either blocked (Conference on
Disarmament) or unproductive (NPT) and which both operate under the consensus
rule for the taking of decisions.
As
well as being able to take decisions by voting, the conduct of the meetings is
more informal and flexible than the CD and the NPT. For instance, interactivity
– i.e., an actual exchange of views or debate – is strongly encouraged. Civil society participates actively. The chair arranges experts to make
presentations in order to stimulate debate.
How is the OEWG contributing to nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation?
The
OEWG is providing a forum in which all states are able to participate alongside intergovernmental organisations and civil society unlike
the CD (65 members) and the NPT (which doesn’t include nuclear armed states,
the DPRK, India, Israel and Pakistan).
What are the limitations and opportunities of
these Open Ended Working Group meetings?
Limitations
have resulted because the nuclear armed states have chosen not to participate,
leaving the defence of nuclear weapons possession and the stationing of US
nuclear weapons on the territories of some NATO allies to states under the
nuclear ‘umbrella’. The opportunity for a direct expression of views from the
weapon states themselves is an important missing ingredient.
Opportunities stem
from the ability for civil society to be heard and to contribute to the debate.
How do milestones such as the visits to
Hiroshima by the US President and US Secretary of State affect nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation? Do these visits help promote this issue?
The
visits have various symbolic impacts, especially President Obama’s as the first
serving US President to come to Hiroshima since the dropping of the atomic
bomb. The visits affect nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by their
recognition of the unique impacts of a nuclear weapon on civilians (as opposed
to conventional bombing), an impact wreaked by a single
weapon rather than hundreds of conventional ones, an impact which is
indiscriminate and, because of radio-activity, goes on killing people and
affecting the health of survivors long after the explosion. It is impossible to
imagine that visitors would not be affected by their visit to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but with the aging
of hibakusha (affected survivors) it will be left to all of us to honour their
testimony and to press for a nuclear weapon free world.
What can be done to achieve a break-through for
a world without nuclear weapons? What else could the people of Hiroshima do to
promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation?
A
nuclear weapon detonation, especially an exchange of nuclear weapons between
enemies, will not respect national boundaries. And the risks of a damaging accident
are difficult to calculate but are greater than zero. Therefore, everyone has a
stake in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. A break-through will
require much wider public understanding that the health, safety and security of
everyone is at stake. The hibakusha and other people of Hiroshima can continue
with their moving efforts to remind us all of the horrific and lasting impacts
of a nuclear weapon.
Tim Caughley
