This posting is a summary of comments I
made during an event on 6 May during the NPT Review Conference. The meeting was organised by Austria, Mexico
and Norway as hosts of three recent conferences on the humanitarian impact of
nuclear weapons. My topic was “the key substantive findings that have emerged
as a result of the humanitarian initiative”. The impacts and trends of the
humanitarian initiative (HI) to date, from a UN perspective, largely fall under
three headings, process, forensic and legal:
1 Process: In process terms the Oslo,
Nayarit and Vienna meetings individually, and in retrospect collectively,
provided a fresh standpoint and perspective for addressing concerns about
nuclear weapons to all states in a forum that was underpinned by the strongly
expressed humanitarian considerations of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The
NPT’s tasking in 2000 and 2010 of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to ‘immediately
establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament’ had come to
nothing. The CD remains paralysed. Some
nuclear weapon states declined to participate in the OEWG. To an extent the
orthodox process vacuum was filled by the HI, although the initiative was
pitched to the entire UN community and civil society, not just to the states
parties of the NPT. All states have a stake in this initiative along with civil
society and intergovernmental organisations—partners with states throughout the
series of conferences.
As US NPT expert Lewis Dunn recently wrote,
the goals of the participants in these conferences have varied. ‘Some want to
highlight nuclear risks and encourage action to reduce them, others want to
energize the NPT nuclear disarmament process, and still others want to
delegitimize nuclear weapons and create support for a new international treaty
to ban the possession of nuclear weapons and to abolish them.’ At this stage,
however, the humanitarian initiative itself has been about accumulating
evidence of the consequences of nuclear weapons. This brings us to the forensic
angle of the initiative.
2 Forensic: i.e., the gathering and
examining of information, evidence and research about the physical effects of
nuclear weapons. And it should be noted in passing that the humanitarian impact
conferences have spurred new facts-based research including the Chatham House
reports on nuclear near misses ‘Too Close for Comfort’ and ‘The “Big Tent” in
Disarmament, UNIDIR’s publication ‘An Illusion of Safety’ and the UNIDIR/ILPI
series of 11 papers for the Vienna and NPT Review Conferences.
- Highlights of evidence emerging from the
three humanitarian impact conferences are these:
a) National borders: The impact of a
nuclear weapon detonation, irrespective of the cause, would not be constrained
by national borders and could have regional and even global consequences.
Certainly, considerable evidence was produced at all three meetings on the
physical properties of nuclear detonations, their indiscriminate effects and
the potential for the fallout from an exchange of weapons in a conflict to have
widespread, long-term impacts.
b) Testing: Historical experience from the
use and testing of nuclear weapons was also demonstrated to have had in some
areas devastating immediate and long-term effects—effects not hitherto given
the recognition they deserve.
c) Health, development and environment:
Beyond the immediate death and destruction caused by a detonation, evidence
suggests that socio-economic development will be hampered, with the poor and
vulnerable being the most severely affected, adverse effects for food security
and considerable environmental damage inflicted. Reconstruction of
infrastructure and regeneration of economic activities, trade, communications,
health facilities, and schools would take several decades, causing profound
social and political harm—the Chernobyl effect but magnified. The human health
impacts would be widespread and affect women more acutely than men.
d) Risk: The risk of nuclear weapons use is
seen as growing globally as a consequence of proliferation, the vulnerability
of nuclear command and control networks to cyber-attacks and to human error,
and potential access to nuclear weapons by non-state actors, in particular
terrorist groups. Low probability yet high consequence events add up to
tangible risk. Indeed, evidence of accidental use and near misses tabled at the
conferences has given the element of risk a new dimension.
e) Preparedness and response: It is
unlikely that any state or international body could address the immediate
humanitarian emergency caused by a nuclear weapon detonation in an adequate
manner. This finding was tested within
the UN humanitarian relief system, and largely substantiated, through a project
conducted by UNIDIR in cooperation with UNOCHA and UNDP. An expectation for UN
relief assistance would quickly manifest itself if the civil nuclear disasters
of Chernobyl and Fukushima are anything to go by, bearing in mind that a
nuclear detonation would be even more devastating.
3 Legal: The 2010 NPT Review Conference
not only expressed its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons but also reaffirmed the need for all
States at all times to comply with applicable international law (IL), including
international humanitarian law (IHL). From
a UN perspective, there are four key legal points.
a) The first derives from the principles of
the UN Charter and the purposes of the UN – the imperative of prevention as the
only guarantee against the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use.
This element was highlighted at all three conferences, as was respect for the
rule of law with particular reference to the Geneva Conventions.
b) Although not an agenda item as such in
Oslo and Nayarit, doubt as to whether a nuclear weapon with its devastating and
indiscriminate effects could be used in compliance with IHL was stimulated by
evidence presented at those events (including references to the ICJ Advisory
Opinion), and was specifically addressed in Vienna along with other norms
relevant to the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.
c) There is the ‘gap’. Unlike the case of
biological and chemical weapons, there is no comprehensive legal norm
universally prohibiting possession, transfer, production and use of nuclear
arms. (There is also a gap in the fulfilment of article VI of the NPT—the
requirement for multilateral negotiation of effective measures for nuclear
disarmament.)
d) International health regulations (IHR)
of the WHO, which provide a framework for the coordination and management of
events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern, would
cover events of a radiological origin.
As well as relevant legal considerations, the Vienna conference also
drew attention to ethical and moral concerns. As is the case with
torture, which defies humanity and is now unacceptable to all, the suffering
caused by nuclear weapons use is not only a legal matter, it necessitates moral
appraisal.
Conclusion
In one short sentence at the end of the UN Secretary-General’s
message to the opening plenary of the NPT Review Conference, the Secretary-General
encapsulated the significance of what has emerged from the humanitarian
initiative. ‘The humanitarian movement’, he said, ‘has injected the moral
imperative into a frozen debate’. This new, evidence-based initiative has
revitalised a debate that has been paralysed in its repetitiveness and lack of
focus or tangible results (an issue that was covered by the next panellist
(Gaukhar Mukhazthanova)).
Tim Caughley
