It is not surprising that interest in
simplifying the annual work programme should be growing. Since 1999, drafts of the programme have
been unnecessarily laden with mandates that have defied the consensus required
for their adoption except in 2009 when there was an-all-too short-lived
breakthrough (CD/1864).
Mandates included in draft work programmes since 1999 are to begin real work on up
to four “core” priorities dealing with nuclear disarmament, fissile material,
outer space and security assurances.
The Rules of Procedure, as well as CD/1036 (a
decision on the “Improved and Effective Functioning” of the Conference adopted
on 21 August 1990), envisage a streamlined approach whereby the programme of
work would be no more than a mere schedule of business rather than an
overarching mandate or mandates for beginning to elaborate a treaty or memorandum of understanding on one or more of the core issues.
Decision CD/1036 led to the current rule on
the work programme, rule 28, with its emphasis on establishing rather than
adopting. This is not a matter of semantics. It means that having established
through his or her consultations that no reasonable objection exists to the schedule
of business for the year, the CD president would get work underway without a
formal decision. In theory at least, the work programme, shorn of mandates,
would be so simple as not to require a formal, consensus decision of the
Conference.
Things haven’t panned out as
envisaged. Mandates on the 4 core
issues have become inseparably linked, and worse, they have been embodied
unnecessarily in draft work programmes. These linkages aren’t accidental. They are deliberate. Therefore they can be broken. A
simplified programme of work might help in that regard.
What would a simplified programme look
like? This column has been offering ideas since 2009 – see list below – and
suggested a possible format
in 2011. Boiled right down, a
simplified approach would have these features:
1. There would be an allocation of time to
be spent during the annual session on each of the 4 core issues and other
substantive agenda items. That timetable would also allocate space for the annual high-level segment and for
agreeing the CD’s report to the UN General Assembly. In addition, it would reserve time for discussion of the outcomes of
the second feature of the programme.
2. Within the allocation of time for each
of the core issues, the central matter for CD members to resolve would be: under
rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure,
is there a need to establish a subsidiary body in which engagement would be
intensified? That is, does a basis exist for the negotiation of “a draft treaty
or other draft texts”? Note that a
subsidiary body is generally regarded as being more appropriate for facilitating
intense engagement than the comparatively stilted, formal option of conducting
work in plenary, although under the Rules, plenary meetings are the default
option and would be the venue for fulfilling this part of the simplified work
programme.
3. As when and if the questions arising
under rule 23 are answered in the affirmative, members would immediately
apportion time from the reserved allocation (see 1. above) for the negotiation
of the necessary mandate. Mandates would evolve independently of each other.
4. Agreement on the negotiated mandates
would require consensus. Decisions
on mandates would take place singly rather than collectively, unless otherwise
agreed (by consensus)(see further below). Agreement
on individual mandates is most unlikely to be achieved simultaneously. The timetable would need to be flexible
enough to deal with that reality.
In weighing the pros and cons of this
simplified approach, the following key considerations arise:
- Does this approach involve bending the Rules
of Procedure? No, it entails applying them more faithfully.
- Will the mandates that have been refined
and embodied in successive draft programmes of work since 1999 remain on the
table? Yes, of course, but they will be examined one-by-one, and judged on
their individual merits rather than as a package of four.
- What is the main advantage of this
approach? It will help members to gauge issue-by-issue whether there really
exists a will to begin serious work on each
priority and, if so, their readiness to compromise on the ingredients of the
mandate that will be required.
This may assist in recalibrating the 4 priorities, for example, in
downgrading the push for security assurances, an issue whose need may have subsided
marginally relative to the other 3 issues. And by considering each issue on its own merits, members
should be able to weigh more acutely the CD’s capacity to make progress on elaborating
more than one “draft treaty or other draft texts” at a time.
- Will treating the mandates one-by-one
guarantee that linkages among them are avoided? No, but any attempt to forge
linkages will necessarily be more transparent. Linkages may be needed, for instance, in developing a framework of issues as a compromise
solution to the standoff over fissile material and nuclear disarmament. Or there may need to be an understanding
over the sequence of treatment of core issues to ensure that none is
unacceptably overwhelmed by intensifying work on others. Members protecting their interests in
such a way on a given issue will necessarily do so openly on the record of the
CD.
The key difference from the present situation is that work on the mandates will be taking place under an agreed work programme, albeit a simplified one. The clock will actually be running. Members will no longer be wringing their hands waiting for the president to pull a rabbit out of the hat.
The key difference from the present situation is that work on the mandates will be taking place under an agreed work programme, albeit a simplified one. The clock will actually be running. Members will no longer be wringing their hands waiting for the president to pull a rabbit out of the hat.
Tim
Caughley, Resident Senior Fellow, UNIDIR
